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devoted to the implications of TRIPS for agricultural and biotechnology innovations. The impact that IPR
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This paper analyzes the main economic issues of intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
protection in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO). A retrospective view 
on the establishment of the TRIPS (trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights) 
Agreement, a still controversial accomplishment of the Uruguay Round of trade 
liberalization, is provided. The paper reviews the economic rationale for the harmoni-
zation of IPRs, drawing both on economic theory considerations as well as emerging 
empirical evidence. The logic of linking IPR protection and trade in the context of the 
WTO is also re-examined. Some specific attention is devoted to the implications of 
TRIPS for agricultural and biotechnology innovations. The impact that IPR protection 
can have in promoting growth and development, and the relation of IPRs with other 
economic policies, is discussed. The paper concludes with an analysis of the prospects for 
more (or less) IPRs-related consensus in the current round of WTO negotiations. 
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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECTS 
 
 
“You invent something, and then someone else 
comes along and does it pretty.” 




The plight of the gifted and rich (and sometimes famous) usually fails to elicit 
much sympathy. But perhaps what is easily overlooked is that success is hard to win, 
and often harder to retain. This is very much the case for the products of human 
inventiveness and creativity—intangible assets that can be quite costly to obtain, that 
may be extremely valuable to society at large, but that can be copied and/or imitated 
very easily. Intellectual property rights (IPRs) such as patents, copyrights, and trade-
marks are quite relevant in that context, allowing the producers of new and/or original 
work to assert (partial) legal ownership on the outcome of their efforts. The notion of 
IPRs is a quintessential product of western civilization, rooted in its individualistic 
view of creativity. Both patents and copyrights appear to have been first used in 
Renaissance Italy (David 1993), and IPRs in general have evolved into a mainstay of 
western legal tradition.1 For most European countries and the United States, a system-
atic legal framework was first achieved in the nineteenth century. Because IPRs are 
rooted in the law, they have traditionally been the prerogative of national jurisdictions, 
although international cooperation in this area, through multilateral treaties and con-
ventions, has a long history. But the internationalization of IPRs got a tremendous 
boost by the TRIPS (trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights) Agreement, 
which was incorporated as one of the core agreements constituting the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) that came into effect on January 1, 1995. 
TRIPS is remarkable from both the viewpoint of past trade liberalization efforts un-
dertaken under the aegis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the 
precursor to the WTO, and from the perspective of international coordination of IPRs as 
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pursued by numerous previous treaties and agreements in the context of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). From the perspective of trade institutions and 
traditions, TRIPS broke from the past by attacking the somewhat arcane issues of IPRs 
and entirely new subject matter. In so doing, the agreement reaches beyond the border 
measures that had been, up to that point, the almost exclusive domain of trade liberaliza-
tion efforts. The need to justify such a less-than-obvious extension of the reach of GATT 
was very much emphasized by the carefully worded prefix “trade-related” that was used 
to characterize the new subject matter. From the perspective of previous international 
efforts at coordinating national IPR rules, TRIPS is remarkable because it bundled 
together the main provisions of the major (and hitherto separate) international IPR 
agreements, because it strengthened the requirements of existing agreements in some 
crucial areas, and because it included the final package as a required element for partici-
pation in the WTO (as part of the “single undertaking” process for ratification). 
Furthermore, enforcement of international IPRs, essentially nonexistent under WIPO, 
under TRIPS can rely on the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and on the threat of 
trade sanctions for noncompliance. This expansion of the scope of WTO activities is 
likely to have important long-run consequences. As one observer put it soon after the 
conclusion of the Uruguay round, “The farmers and the issues of agricultural subsidies 
have the limelight. TRIPS, however, will over time play a bigger role in the global 
economic drama” (Drahos 1995). 
A number of sound arguments can be marshaled to explain why IPRs play an in-
creasingly critical role in international economic relations (Maskus 2000). The root of the 
economic problem is that an increasing share of economic activity worldwide is aimed at 
the production of goods and services that require considerable R&D investment. Figure 1 
provides some indirect evidence in terms of manufacturing trade in OECD (Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. About two-thirds of such trade is 
currently accounted for by high and medium-high technology products, and the rate of 
increase of these products’ trade in the 1990s has been much faster than that of other 
manufacturing products. Furthermore, R&D outputs create the potential for trade in 
technology per se, e.g., transactions involving technology not embedded in intermediate 
inputs or final products. Table 1, reporting receipts and payments for disembodied 
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Source: OECD, Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2001. 
Notes. Trade is measured as the average value of exports and imports. High-technology industries: Aircraft and 
spacecraft; Pharmaceuticals; Office, accounting and computing machinery; Radio, television and communication 
equipment; Medical, precision and optical instruments. Medium-high-technology industries: Electrical machinery and 
apparatus; Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers; Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals; Railroad equipment and 
transport equipment; Machinery and equipment. 
Medium-low-technology industries: Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel; Rubber and plastic products; 
Other non-metallic mineral products; Building and repairing of ships and boats; Basic metals; Fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and equipment. Low-technology industries: Manufacturing, and recycling; Pulp, paper, 
paper products, printing and publishing; Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear; Food products, beverages and 
tobacco; Wood and products of wood and cork.  
 
FIGURE 1. OECD manufacturing trade by technology intensity (index, 1990=100) 
 
technology transfers, provides some evidence on the current extent of such international 
exchanges for OECD countries. Quite clearly, the international exchange of high-
technology goods and services, and especially of technology itself, relies heavily on the 
possibility of protecting the underlying R&D investment from expropriation by copying 
and imitation. Such considerations would seem to establish the need for some interna-
tional protection of IPRs and the possible scope for joint consideration of IPRs and trade 
issues. Yet, a number of known international economists have over time expressed 
skepticisms about the wisdom of including IPRs in the WTO (e.g., Deardorff 1990; 
Bhagwati 1991; Panagariya 1999; Srinivasan 2002).  
TRIPS was controversial before its inception, and it remains so today. The recent de-
bate over access to patented drugs by poor countries, to treat epidemics such as 
AIDS/HIV, has brought the problem to the attention of the public at large. Additional  
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TABLE 1. Technology balance of payments, 1999 (millions of U.S. dollars) 
 Receipts Payments Balance 
    
Canada 1,874 1,152 722 
Mexico 64 452 -389 
United States 36,467 13,275 23,192 
    
Australia 103 225 -122 
Japan 8,435 3,602 4,833 
Korea 141 2,387 -2,246 
New Zealand 5 9 -4 
    
Austria 2,348 2,553 -205 
Belgium-Luxembourg 5,099 4,238 861 
Denmark 1,657 1,055 602 
Finland 109 63 46 
France 2,590 3,124 -534 
Germany 12,513 16,218 -3,705 
Ireland 528 8,820 -8,292 
Italy 3,367 4,236 -868 
Norway 917 1,241 -324 
Poland 129 668 -539 
Portugal 311 809 -498 
Spain 191 1,025 -835 
Switzerland 2,985 1,338 1,647 
United Kingdom 6,081 3,172 2,909 
    
European Union* 41,675 51,787 -10,112 
Total OECD* 90,984 73,624 17,360 
Source: OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard, 2001. 
Notes: The data comprise unaffiliated and affiliated transfers of disembodied technology including patents 
(purchases, sales), licenses for patents, un-patented know-how, models and designs, trademarks (including 
franchising), technical services, and finance of industrial R&D outside national territory. The data do not 
cover: commercial, financial, managerial and legal assistance; advertising, insurance, transport; films, 
recordings, material covered by copyright, and software.  
* = Includes intra-zone flows. 
 
efforts at understanding the complex issues involved are perhaps warranted. The purpose 
of this paper is to provide a retrospective view and a tentative assessment of the role of 
IPRs in the WTO and to venture a few considerations on the prospects for IPRs in the 
current round of multilateral trade negotiations.  
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Intellectual Property Rights 
IPRs are property rights defined over intangible assets that are the result of human 
inventiveness and creativity. Patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets are the 
most common forms of IPRs, although related but distinct forms of intellectual protection 
exist to deal explicitly with specific types of innovations (Moschini 2003).  
Patents are arguably the strongest form of IPRs. A patent typically is issued by a 
government agency—in the United States, for example, the Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO)—upon successful evaluation of an application. It confers to the inventor the sole 
right to exclude others from economically exploiting the innovation (by making it, using 
it, selling it, etc.) for a limited time (20 years from the date of filing, for most countries). 
To be patentable, an innovation must be novel in the sense of not constituting part of the 
prior art. The innovation must also involve an inventive step (it must be non-obvious to a 
person with ordinary skills in the particular field of application), and it must be useful 
(the innovation must permit the solution of a particular problem in at least one applica-
tion). A major requirement of a patent application is disclosure: the patent application 
must describe the invention in sufficient detail to enable those skilled in the particular 
field to practice it. The foregoing describes so-called “utility patents,” the most important 
and common kind (see Merges 1997 for more details). The subject matter of such patents 
encompasses machines, industrial processes, composition of matter, and articles of 
manufacture.2 Other patents that can be obtained concern “industrial design,” which 
protects visual aspects of a product (as opposed to its technical features), and “utility 
model” (petty) patents.  
Copyrights apply to original works of authorship, such as books, photographs, sound 
recordings, motion pictures, and other artistic works in general. An explicit condition for 
such creative expressions to claim protection by copyrights is that they be fixed in a 
tangible medium (because copyrights protect the form of expression rather than the 
subject matter). Unlike patents, there is no novelty or usefulness requirement, although 
there are conditions of originality (the work has not been copied) and authorship. Regis-
tration may be possible, but typically property rights under copyright statutes exist 
independently of such a formality. Protection under copyrights typically extends for the 
6 / Moschini 
lifetime of the owner plus 50 years (lifetime of the owner plus 70 years in the United 
States and the European Union).  
A trademark is a sign, word, symbol, or device (which may include or combine let-
ters, numbers, pictures, emblems, etc.) that distinguishes the goods or services of an 
enterprise from those of others. No novelty or originality is necessary, but the main 
requirement is distinctiveness (a mark cannot be a generic description). For trademarks to 
be valid they typically have to be registered (in the United States, for example, with the 
PTO). Any unauthorized use of a mark identical (or confusingly similar) to a valid 
trademark is prohibited. Protection of trademarks does not have a time limit, provided the 
trademarks are used and renewed periodically.  
Trade secrets cover any confidential business information—including formulae, de-
vices, methods, techniques, and processes—that may confer an advantage over 
competitors from the fact that it is not generally known. For trade secret protection to 
apply, the general requirement is that reasonable efforts be undertaken to maintain 
secrecy. More specifically, protection is extended against another party’s discovery by 
inappropriate means, but a trade secret offers no protection against independent discovery 
or reverse engineering.  
Specific IPR instruments suited to particular types of innovations (sui generis sys-
tems) have been developed. Of interest to agriculture is the protection of plant 
innovations through so-called Plant Breeder’s Rights (PBRs). For example, in the 
United States such rights are defined by the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act, 
whereby the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) can issue Plant Variety Protec-
tion (PVP) certificates. Varieties claiming a protection certificate must be new and 
must satisfy requirements of distinctiveness, uniformity, and stability. The protection 
offered by PVP certificates is similar to that provided by patents (including a standard 
20-year term) with two qualifications. First, there is a “research exception,” meaning 
that protected varieties may be used by others for research purposes (e.g., to develop 
other new varieties). Second, there is a “farmer’s privilege,” that is, seed of protected 
varieties can be saved by farmers for their own replanting (but farmers are prohibited 
from reselling protected seeds). Other important sui generis IPRs include Integrated 
computer circuit rights, which protect the layout design of integrated computer circuits 
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(chips). Unlike patents, novelty and nonobviousness are not required here (originality 
suffices). Geographical indications (as applying for example to wine and spirits in 
TRIPS) are meant to protect reputation about quality that is associated with a particu-
lar region of origin. It is similar to a trademark, but it is not privately owned. Database 
rights are meant to prevent unauthorized use of database compilations (but do not 
confer exclusive rights to the data themselves). At present such rights are available in 
the European Union but not in the United States. 
 
Intellectual Property Rights in an International Setting 
As noted earlier, although IPR protection is rooted in the law and as such is the pre-
rogative of national jurisdictions, international cooperation in this area, through 
multilateral treaties and conventions, has a long tradition dating back to the nineteenth 
century. Prior to TRIPS, virtually all international treaties and conventions dealing with 
IPRs were administered by WIPO, a United Nations agency with headquarters in Geneva, 
Switzerland. A cornerstone of this system is the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property, the most recent substantive version being the 1967 Stockholm 
revision (164 countries are currently party to this convention). This convention provides 
that each country extends to the citizens of other countries the same patent rights avail-
able to its own citizens (the principle of “national treatment”). It also allows for a right of 
priority, such that upon filing in a member nation an inventor can, within one year, seek 
protection in other countries with the original filing date applying. The 1979 Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) is meant to facilitate filing for patent protection for the same 
invention in member countries by providing centralized filing and standardized applica-
tion procedures. In connection with patents, WIPO also administers the 1977 Budapest 
Treaty, which governs the deposit of microorganisms or biotechnology products as 
required for patent filing.  
The 1986 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (its last 
main revision was in 1971) is the major international treaty that applies to works pro-
tected by copyrights. Signatories are required to afford foreign authors the same rights 
available to their own nationals, including the right of enforcement, and to establish a 
minimum copyright term (the life of the author plus 50 years). The 1961 Rome Conven-
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tion extends copyrights protection to sound recording, performers of music, and radio and 
television broadcasts. Trademarks are protected by several international treaties, includ-
ing the aforementioned Paris Convention, which assure national treatment as well as 
protection of well-known marks worldwide. There are many other conventions and 
treaties that apply to IPRs; see WIPO (2001) for more details.  
International coordination of PBRs is an exception in that it is not the prerogative of 
WIPO. Instead, PBRs are managed by the International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (UPOV, after its French acronym), an intergovernmental organization 
with headquarters in Geneva. UPOV was established in 1961, and later revisions to its 
convention (1972, 1978, and 1991) tightened the characterization of the rights involved. 
The latest UPOV convention (1991) allows countries to provide protection for new 
varieties with both PVP certificates and utility patents, and allows (but does not require) 
countries to permit farmers to save protected seeds for replanting.  
 
The TRIPS Agreement 
In some ways, TRIPS was the outcome of an unprecedented effort initiated by a 
broad coalition of business interests, mostly from the United States. This fascinating 
story, as told by Drahos (1995) and Matthews (2002), starts with the poor performance of 
U.S. corporations in the 1980s and the associated fear of a secular decline in their interna-
tional competitiveness. It was concluded that, vis-à-vis the competition of Japanese firms 
for example, the United States was experiencing a massive free rider problem on its ideas 
and expertise. Stronger IPRs abroad seemed a natural and simple solution. The idea of 
linking IPRs and trade was pursued vigorously by business representatives from a few 
industries, especially from pharmaceutical, chemical, and computer-related companies, a 
line of attack that eventually won over initially reluctant copyright-based industries (such 
as music and entertainment). This broad-based, single-issue agenda first succeeded in 
convincing Congress to amend the “Section 301” provisions of the U.S. Trade and Tariff 
Act in 1984, making failure to protect IPRs by any country actionable with trade sanc-
tions. This tool, and the subsequent “Special 301” of 1988, proved quite useful in the 
U.S. carrot-and-stick approach to bilateral trade negotiation, and also allowed a closer 
cooperation between business interests and the office of the U.S. Trade Representative. 
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With the support of Europe and Japan, IPRs were successfully included in the negotiating 
agenda for the Uruguay Round. As articulated in the ministerial declaration of Punta del 
Este in September 1986, the aspirations in this area were somewhat modest, being 
focused mostly around the issue of trade in counterfeit goods and the role that IPRs and 
GATT rules ought to play in that context. But what emerged at the end was a much more 
sweeping and ambitious program, one that made TRIPS probably the most important 
international agreement on IPRs ever. 
A summary of the main elements of TRIPS is reported in the Appendix. It is clear 
that the scope of TRIPS is quite extensive, as it covers copyright and related rights (i.e., 
the rights of performers, producers of sound recordings and broadcasting organizations); 
trademarks, including service marks; geographical indications, including appellations of 
origin; industrial designs; patents, including the protection of new varieties of plants; the 
layout designs of integrated circuits; and undisclosed information, including trade secrets 
and test data. Perhaps more important are the main principles enshrined in TRIPS: 
national treatment, most-favored-nation, and minimum standards. National treatment 
requires that the same rights be equally available to nationals and foreigners, and it has 
been a cardinal element of virtually all the previous efforts at coordinating international 
IPRs. But the other two principles are new to the international arena concerning IPRs. 
The most-favored-nation (MFN) clause (equal treatment for nationals of all trading 
partners in the WTO) is, of course, central to other WTO agreements, and it has the 
potential to amplify increased IPR protection that may result from bilateral negotiations.3   
It is in the setting of minimum standards,4 however, that TRIPS provides perhaps the 
most ambitious departures from existing international IPR coordination. In particular, the 
agreement mandates that minimum standards of IPR protection be provided by each 
member in each of the main areas of intellectual property that it covers. This is achieved 
by spelling out the subject matter to be protected, the rights to be conferred (and what the 
permissible exceptions to those rights are), and the minimum duration of protection. The 
main obligations of the Paris Convention and of the Berne Convention are incorporated 
by reference and must be complied with.5 Except for the Berne Convention provisions on 
moral rights, all the main provisions of these conventions became obligations under the 
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TRIPS Agreement between WTO member countries because of the “single undertaking” 
approach of the WTO (there is no opt-out choice).  
The TRIPS Agreement also adds a number of additional new obligations not contem-
plated by previous conventions. Patent protection must be accorded for both products and 
processes, for at least 20 years, in almost all fields of technology. Plant varieties must be 
protected, either by patents or by a sui generis protection system (such as PBRs). Domestic 
production of a patented product cannot be required in order to enjoy the rights of a patent 
holder. With respect to trademarks, the requirement that foreign marks be used in conjunc-
tion with local marks is prohibited, and cancellation of a mark on the grounds of nonuse is 
restricted. TRIPS departs from pre-existing norms by ensuring that computer programs be 
protected by copyrights under the provisions of the Berne Convention. It also introduces 
provisions on rental rights (e.g., authors of computer programs and producers of sound 
recordings have the right to authorize or prohibit the commercial rental of their works). 
With respect to geographical indications, a higher level of protection is provided for wines 
and spirits (which are protected even when there is no danger of the public's being misled). 
With respect to the protection of layout designs of integrated circuits, TRIPS extends the 
incorporated treaty provisions by requiring a minimum protection period of 10 years, and 
that the rights must extend to articles incorporating infringing layout designs. Trade secret 
protection is explicitly imparted by TRIPS. In particular, test data submitted to govern-
ments in order to obtain marketing approval for pharmaceutical or agricultural chemicals 
must be protected against unfair commercial use. 
In addition to spelling out the rights on intellectual property to be provided by mem-
bers, TRIPS also addresses obligations related to the enforcements of those rights. 
Member governments must provide procedures and remedies under their domestic law to 
ensure that IPRs can be effectively enforced. The procedures provided must be fair and 
equitable, should not discriminate against foreigners, and must not be unnecessarily 
complicated, costly, or subject to unreasonable time delays. Notable enforcement obliga-
tions include rules for obtaining evidence (in some cases reversing the burden of proof), 
and the availability of provisional measures, injunctions, damages, and other penalties. 
Also, willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale must be 
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treated as a criminal offense. Governments must also ensure that the assistance of cus-
toms authorities be made available to prevent imports of counterfeit and pirated goods. 
A fundamental feature of TRIPS is that, by taking IPR protection under the aegis of 
the WTO, international enforcement of IPRs can be pursued within the structure available 
to enforce compliance with trade rules. A Council for TRIPS was established to monitor 
the operation of the agreement and governments’ compliance with it. Perceived failures 
by member governments can be pursued under the integrated WTO dispute-settlement 
procedures. In particular, the threat of trade sanctions is expected to considerably 
strengthen the international enforcement of IPRs.  
TRIPS envisioned a differentiated phase-in period for WTO member states’ compli-
ance. Specifically, relative to its January 1995 date of birth, TRIPS allowed for a one-year 
transition period for developed countries to bring their legislation and practices into com-
pliance. Developing countries and (under certain conditions) transition economies were 
given five years, whereas least-developed countries (LDCs) were allowed an 11-year 
transition period.6  Theoretically, therefore, all WTO contracting parties should be in full 
compliance with TRIPS as of January 2006. But LDCs are allowed, under article 66, to 
seek postponement of their obligations to implement TRIPS. In addition, in the 2001 Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health, LDCs were given an extension 
(until January 2016) for implementing their obligations related to pharmaceuticals. 
 
More on Agriculture-Related Intellectual Property Rights 
Agriculture-related innovations enjoy a somewhat special and rather complicated set 
of IPRs, the effects of which have been mostly ignored, until recently, in economic 
analyses of agricultural innovations (Moschini and Lapan, 1997). Under TRIPS, plant 
and animal innovations need not be protected by patents, and indeed, they often are not. 
In the United States, however, the landmark 1980 U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty opened the door for patent rights for virtually any biologically 
based invention, if obtained through human intervention. And in its 2001 ruling in J.E.M. 
Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
plant seeds and plants themselves (both traditionally bred or produced by genetic engi-
neering) are patentable under U.S. law (Janis and Kesan, 2002). But plant varieties, for 
12 / Moschini 
example, are explicitly not patentable in Europe by the statute of the European Patent 
Office.7 PBRs, in the blueprint provided by UPOV, are more commonly used internation-
ally for plant varieties, and in fact they may become the sui generis IPR system allowed 
for by TRIPS in this area. But PBRs are clearly weaker than patents, mostly because they 
allow for a “research exception” and for the farmer’s right to save seed for replanting (the 
“farmer’s privilege”). Trade secrets also can be quite important for plants, at least in 
developed countries. For example, Pioneer Hi-Bred International successfully used trade 
secrets to protect its germplasm in at least two high-profile cases (against Holden Foun-
dation Seeds, Inc. in 1991, for a judgment worth an estimated $46.7 million, and against 
Cargill, Inc. in 2000, for a settlement estimated at $100 million). Other instruments can 
be brought to bear on private companies’ attempts to assert ownership of plant innova-
tions. These include the use of hybrids (provided parent lines can be protected, possibly 
by trade secrets, patents, or PBRs), genetic use restriction technologies made possible by 
recent biotechnology innovations (such as the so-called terminator gene), and specific 
contractual arrangements such as the “bag-label” contracts that are common in the United 
States (Boettiger et al. 2003). 
There are also other conventions, treaties, and initiatives that attempt to shape the 
ongoing evolution of international IPRs in agriculture, often with reference to develop-
ment issues and biodiversity. These include the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) and the 2001 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (IT-PGRFA) (Dutfield, 2000; Boettiger et al., 2003). One of the aspects of 
CBD was the assertion of national sovereignty over biological resources, a response to 
concerns over the perceived “biopiracy” associated with bioprospecting activities by 
pharmaceutical firms. Current discussions of the role of IPRs in implementing the goals 
of the CBD center on their effects on access to genetic resources, more equitable sharing 
of the benefits thereof, as well as protection of the practices of indigenous and local 
communities (Dutfield, 2003). One of the main objectives of the IT-PGRFA, developed 
under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, is to 
preserve and further the free exchange of germplasm, with the ultimate goal of furthering 
food security for the world. The IT-PGRFA envisions the establishment of a multilateral 
system for the sharing of plant materials governed by standardized material transfer 
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agreements. One of the implicit principles of this vision is to consider existing biodiver-
sity as a “common heritage” of mankind, a view somewhat at odds with the national 
sovereignty espoused by the CBD. The IT-PGRFA also makes reference to “farmers’ 
rights,” a somewhat vague notion asserting rights arising from the past, present, and 
future contributions of farmers in improving and conserving plant genetic resources. The 
aim here, similar to some objectives of the CBD, is to include farmers in the sharing of 
benefits that may arise from subsequent innovations, as carried out by seed companies 
and possibly protected by patents, for example (Boettiger et al. 2003).  
Much of the modern agriculture-related R&D concerns biotechnology innovations. 
Biotechnology as such is not mentioned in TRIPS, but inventions and activities usually 
associated with biotechnology are, and it turns out that TRIPS provides quite a bit of 
flexibility in this area. As noted, plants and animals may be excluded from patentability. 
Essentially biological processes may also be excluded from patentability, but patents 
must be provided for microorganisms, and for microbiological processes for producing 
plants or animals.8  Also, as noted earlier, TRIPS mandates that plant varieties must be 
protected, either by patents or by a sui generis system such as PBRs.  
That the rise of biotechnology has relied crucially on access to patents is illustrated, 
for the United States, in Table 2. Over the last decade, biotechnology patents have  
 










Maize and  
Soybean Plants 
1991 96,513 1,562 29 1 
1992 97,444 1,968 48 13 
1993 98,343 2,258 38 2 
1994 101,676 2,179 99 31 
1995 101,419 2,252 91 20 
1996 109,646 3,086 253 63 
1997 111,984 4,142 281 52 
1998 147,521 6,132 497 154 
1999 153,493 6,220 670 199 
2000 157,497 5,601 630 204 
2001 184,172 6,281 665 162 
2002 184,531 5,738 554 103 
Source: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
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increased at a much faster rate than overall patenting, and this growth is even higher for 
multicellular living organisms (the patent class that comprises plants and animal innova-
tions of direct interest to agriculture). The last column of Table 2 also shows that, in the 
United States, patents are being used fairly extensively to claim plant varieties and inbred 
lines, something that specifically is not possible in most other jurisdictions. A concern 
that has arisen recently in biotechnology refers to the fragmentation of IPR ownership. 
The problem is that producing a complex innovation (such as a transgenic crop) typically 
requires a number of intermediate inputs that are patented. Insofar as the patented inputs 
are highly complementary, the patent owners for these inputs essentially hold blocking 
power, so that the manufacturer of the innovation may become susceptible to hold-up. 
This is essentially the notion of the “tragedy of the anticommons” discussed by Heller 
and Eisenberg (1998). Related concerns refer to the “freedom to operate” in a research 
area in which many necessary tools are patented and there is extreme fragmentation on 
IPRs, although the constraints here may be less binding in an international context 
(Binenbaum et al. 2003). 
 
The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights 
The crucial feature of IPRs, from the perspective of economics, is that they deal with 
something valuable that can be easily reproduced. The implications are best illustrated for 
the case of patents. As discussed earlier, patents (a) deal with new knowledge, as embod-
ied in an innovative product or process, and (b) confer (limited) exclusive (i.e., 
monopoly) rights to the inventor. New knowledge that makes possible the production of 
new products and/or processes is potentially very valuable, but it has features that make it 
problematic for the market system to handle properly because knowledge is a quintessen-
tial “public good” (Arrow 1962). Pure public goods have two distinguishing attributes. 
First, they are non-rival in consumption, which means that use of the good does not affect 
the amount of it that is available for others. Second, they are nonexcludable, which means 
that it is not possible to prevent individuals from using a public good once it is available. 
Clearly, absent legal means to prevent that, most discoveries and inventions would 
exhibit public good attributes. The problems that arise in a competitive market system are 
readily apparent. An inventor may bear all the cost of an innovation, but everyone can 
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benefit (possibly to varying degrees) from a discovery, and thus everyone has an incen-
tive to “free ride” on the innovative efforts of others. The externalities associated with 
such public goods give rise to a potentially serious market failure. Absent IPRs, eco-
nomic agents may lack sufficient incentives to undertake costly innovation activities, and 
thus a competitive market system would typically provide an inefficiently low level of 
innovations. Because the nonappropriability of knowledge is what lies at the heart of this 
market failure, IPRs can be quite useful in that they provide a legal means of affecting the 
excludability attributes of an otherwise pure public good.  
 
Closed (Integrated) Economy Considerations 
Whereas the exclusive privileges offered by IPRs clearly improve on the incentives 
available to would-be innovators, it is clear that they only represent a second-best solu-
tion. In particular, by essentially creating monopolies, IPRs introduce a novel source of 
distortions into the economic system. Ex ante, it may be beneficial to provide incentives 
in the form of exclusive rights, because that may bring about innovations that would not 
otherwise take place. But ex post, the monopoly position granted by the exclusivity of 
IPRs is inefficient. Given that an innovation is available, ex post efficiency would pre-
scribe that it be used as widely as possible, that is, be made available at marginal 
production costs. But that is precisely what a profit-maximizing monopolist will not do. 
This brings to the fore the essential economic trade-off inherent in most IPRs systems: 
there are dynamic gains because of improved innovation incentives, but there are static 
losses because of restricted use of the innovation. Earlier economic analysis focused 
extensively on the inefficiency associated with the artificially created monopoly and 
questioned the economic desirability of the patent system (see Machlup and Penrose 1950 
for an enlightening reconstruction of the nineteenth-century patent debate). But modern 
economics recognizes the tangible benefits of an IPR system, along the lines anticipated 
by John Stuart Mills:9 
The condemnation of monopolies ought not to extend to patents … 
[A]n exclusive privilege, of temporary duration is preferable [to a cash 
reward paid by the state]; because it leaves nothing to anyone’s discre-
tion; because the reward conferred by it depends upon the invention 
being found useful, and the greater the usefulness, the greater the re-
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ward; and because it is paid by the very person to whom the service is 
rendered, the consumers of the commodity. 
To illustrate the main economic rationale for, and features of, IPR protection, con-
sider an economy where there is a continuum of potential inventors, each with a unique 
possible innovation that is indexed by the parameter (0, ]θ θ∈ . To represent the fact that 
each potential innovation has a different social value, we will assume that the willingness 
to pay is the same for all innovations, but that each innovation entails a different R&D 
cost. Specifically, the per-period marginal willingness to pay (the aggregate inverse 
demand function) for each innovation is written as 
 p qα β= − . 
Once developed, each innovation can be produced at a constant unit cost c  and 
yields a flow of benefits (as per the above demand function) forever. For analytical 
convenience (and without loss of generality), set 0c = , such that the potential per-period 
benefit from each innovation (which would be attained if the innovation were efficiently 
supplied) is 2 (2 )α β , and thus the potential (gross) value to society of the innovation is 
2 (2 )rα β , where r  is the discount rate. Let the possible innovations be ordered accord-
ing to their cost, and for simplicity write the fixed cost ( )F θ  of developing the θ  
innovation as 2( )F θ θ= . Thus, all innovations for which *θ θ≤ , where * 2 (2 )rθ α β= , 
should be undertaken. But if innovations can be copied costlessly, no one has an incen-
tive to innovate in a competitive setting.  
Suppose now that a patent of length 0T >  is available to innovators, such that they 
can behave as a monopoly for T  periods. Monopolistic pricing yields a per-period profit 
of 2 (4 )α β  for each innovation undertaken, such that the present value to the innovator 
(assuming that the same discount rate r  applies) is  










= = −∫ . 
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With this patent system, all innovations for which 0 ( )Fπ θ≥  are undertaken, that is, all 











RESULT 1. A patent system improves welfare, relative to a competitive innovation system, 
but the resulting flow of innovations is still less than socially desirable (i.e., *ˆ0 θ θ< < ). 
 
With patents, the total (gross) surplus from each innovation that is undertaken is 
 












= + = +∫ ∫  
where the formulation accounts for the fact that after T  periods the innovation will be 
competitively available at zero cost. To derive an explicit solution for the optimal patent 
life, assume that θ  is uniformly distributed, such that the total R&D cost ˆ( )R θ  of under-
taking all innovation projects for which ˆθ θ≤  is 
 ( )
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Hence, the net total welfare from all innovations undertaken with a patent of length T  is 
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RESULT 2. The optimal patent life is finite. 
 
This result displays the often-mentioned trade-off, for a patent system, between dynamic 
efficiency (more innovations) and static efficiency (larger quantities of any given innova-
tion) (e.g., Nordhaus, 1969). Although setting T = ∞  would increase the flow of 
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innovations, that is not optimal because each innovation is underprovided by the mo-
nopolist. With T < ∞ , fewer innovations are developed, but each one is efficiently 
supplied after T  periods. The market for a typical innovation is illustrated in Figure 2A 
(for the case 0c > ), where Mq  represents the monopolistically supplied innovation for 
the duration of patent protection, and Cq  represents the efficient level of ex post provi-
sion of the innovation. 
Now suppose that the economy grows, such that the aggregate demand for each in-
novation expands. This change can be parameterized by increasing α  or by decreasing 
β . The former may be appropriate when a given economy becomes wealthier; the latter 
may represent an economy that is enlarged by adding more regions to it (cf. Figures 2.A 
and 2.B). Either way, such growth entails that more innovations are desired by the 
economy ( *θ  increases). But because the optimal patent *T  is independent of α  and/or 
β , it follows that: 
RESULT 3. The optimal patent life is invariant to the size of the economy. 
Thus, ceteris paribus (and abstracting from strategic considerations to be discussed in 
what follows), small and large economies have equal scope for patent protection in this 
model. Whereas this result is somewhat special and due to the particular modeling 
structure, there is a related general point. For any given innovation, a growth in demand 
 
 
FIGURE 2.A. Patents and the incentive to innovate: integrated economy 
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allows larger monopoly profit and thus would suggest that a shorter patent length is 
needed to justify incurring the required fixed R&D cost. But a wealthier economy desires 
more innovations (i.e., the first-best level of R&D increases with the size of the economy 
because innovation is a public good, and thus its efficient provision is governed by the 
Samuelson condition which relates to the “sum” of the marginal willingness to pay). The 
incentive for private R&D under IPRs, because it derives from the profits that a monopo-
list can realize, is already directly affected by an expansion of the economy, and thus no 
strengthening (or weakening) of IPRs may be necessary.10 
 
Open Economy Considerations 
The model of Figure 2A represents a closed economy, but it may as well represent the 
integrated world economy. Suppose that the world is made up of two (identical, for the 
sake of simplicity) countries with independent IPR regimes, as represented in Figure 2B. 
The international dimension of IPR protection is immediately apparent. If neither country 
protects IPRs, there are no incentives for private agents to undertake the required R&D to 
develop the new product. If both countries protect IPRs equally, then the solution is the 
same as with the integrated economy, and 1 2 0π π π+ = . If only one country, say country 
1, provides patent protection, then the per-period profit for the would-be innovator is 
1 0π π< . Two possibilities arise in this context. First, 1π  is large enough, relative to the 
R&D costs F , so that the innovation is undertaken anyway. Consequently, country 1 has 
the same price and quantity provision as with the integrated (and IPR protected) economy 
case, whereas country 2 has access to the innovation at the competitive price Cp c=  
with efficient quantity provision Cq . Restricting the attention to this one innovation, and 
conditional on the innovation being undertaken anyway, there would seem to be no 
dynamic gains from increased IPR protection, and doing away with IPRs in country 2 
increases the consumption of the new product and therefore increases welfare. But such 
potential welfare gains (relative to the integrated and protected economy) are extremely 
uneven because they all accrue to country 2 (consumers in the IPR-protected country 
essentially subsidize those in the country without IPRs). The second case, however, is  
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FIGURE 2.B. Patents and the incentive to innovate: two-country model  
 
that 1π  is not large enough (relative to F ) to justify investment in R&D, and so no 
innovation takes place. In such a case both countries lose from the absence of IPRs in one 
of the countries. More to the point, however, is that IPR protection cannot be tailored to 
one product, and discussing welfare implication in just one market is misleading. As the 
analysis of the simple model considered earlier illustrates, weakening IPR protection also 
means that not enough incentives exist for some products, and the resulting insufficient 
level of innovation is deleterious to welfare.  
Although somewhat simplistic, the framework just discussed brings forth the addi-
tional considerations that pertain to the economics of IPRs in an open economy, namely 
the existence of cross-border externalities, with calls for a coordinated policy response. 
That such externalities are potentially quite sizeable is illustrated by Table 3, which 
reports R&D expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product for a large collec-
tion of countries. It is apparent that global R&D efforts are quite unevenly distributed 
across countries. The few developing countries included in this table display very low 
R&D expenditures; indeed, for most developing countries R&D is, at present, insignifi-
cant. To illustrate some effects of an increase in IPR protection as engineered by TRIPS, 
suppose that Figure 2B illustrates the status quo ante, with country 1 already offering 
patent protection and country 2 without patent protection, and consider the ex post 
situation where the innovation has already taken place. The effect of strengthening IPRs  
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TABLE 3. R&D as a percentage of gross domestic product 
Country Percent Country/Region Percent 
Sweden (1997)  3.70 Brazil (1996)  0.91 
Japan (1999)  3.01 Spain (1999)  0.89 
Finland (1998)  2.89 Slovak Republic (1998)  0.86 
Switzerland (1996)  2.73 Cuba (1999)  0.83 
United States (1999)  2.63 Poland (1999)  0.75 
South Korea (1998)  2.55 China (1998)  0.69 
Israel (1997)  2.54 South Africa (1998)  0.69 
Germany (1999)  2.38 Hungary (1999)  0.68 
France (1999)  2.17 Chile (1997)  0.63 
Denmark (1999)  1.99 Portugal (1997)  0.62 
Belgium (1999)  1.98 Romania (1998)  0.54 
Taiwan (1998)  1.97 Greece (1997)  0.51 
Netherlands (1998)  1.95 Turkey  (1997)  0.49 
Iceland (1999)  1.88 Argentina (1999)  0.47 
United Kingdom (1999)  1.87 Colombia (1997)  0.41 
Canada (1999)  1.85 Mexico (1997)  0.34 
Austria (1999)  1.82 Panama (1998)  0.33 
Norway (1999)  1.73 Bolivia (1999)  0.29 
Australia (1998)  1.49 Uruguay (1999)  0.26 
Singapore (1997)  1.47 Malaysia (1996)  0.22 
Slovenia (1997)  1.42 Trinadad and Tobago (1997)  0.14 
Ireland (1997)  1.39 Nicaragua (1997)  0.13 
Czech Republic (1999)  1.27 Ecuador (1998)  0.08 
Costa Rica (1996)  1.13 El Salvador (1998)  0.08 
New Zealand (1997)  1.13 Peru (1997)  0.06 
Italy (1999)  1.04   
Russian Federation (1999)  1.06 Total OECD  (1998)  2.18 
  European Union  (1998)  1.81 
Source: U.S. National Science Foundation, Science & Engineering Indicators, 2002. 
 
in country 2, to the standards of country 1, is to reduce consumption and welfare in 
country 2, and to provide a profit windfall of 2π  to the innovator. And, if the innovator is 
in country 1, that means new monetary transfer that country 2 must make to country 1. 
Understandably, countries with lower IPR protection can see immediate negative effects 
to strengthening IPRs. 
More can of course be said about the economics of IPRs in an international context. 
Deardorff (1992) presents a model where limiting patent protection geographically may 
be desirable. As discussed earlier, the optimal trade-off between dynamic gains and static 
losses calls for limiting the monopoly power granted to the innovator, that is, a finite 
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patent life. The analogy here is that, for a given patent life, extending the set of countries 
providing IPRs should, from a welfare perspective, proceed only as far as necessary to 
provide enough innovation incentive, and no more. But, as the invariance in Result 3 
discussed earlier illustrates, Deardorff’s (1992) result on this point is special to his model.  
Deardorff (1992) assumes that inventions can take place only in one country, and the 
question is whether IPR protection should be extended to other countries that only 
consume the innovation product. A similar approach is taken by Chin and Grossman 
(1990), who model innovation in an international duopoly with two countries, each with 
one producer of a homogeneous product, and Cournot competition in the integrated final 
market. Innovation can take place only in one country (the “North”), where R&D invest-
ment can achieve a reduction in the unit cost, but this process innovation can be imitated 
at no cost by the firm in the “South” if no IPR is provided there. This set-up brings to the 
fore the typically conflicting interests that countries face in this context. Whereas the 
North always benefits from IPR protection in the South, the South may lose or may gain 
from such a policy change. Indeed, global efficiency need not be increased in this model 
either, and the world may well be worse off by increased protection. In contrast to these 
models, Helpman (1993) treats innovation as an ongoing process in a North-South 
dynamic general equilibrium model rooted in the endogenous growth literature. Only the 
North can innovate, and innovations are diffused to the South through imitation (the rate 
of which is taken to be a measure of the strength of IPRs in the South). Helpman shows 
that the South is unlikely to benefit from tighter IPRs. The North may or may not benefit 
from stronger IPRs in the South (unlike the aforementioned studies, in Helpman’s [1993] 
model there are conditions where no conflict exists between the interests of North and 
South: with initial low rates of imitation both regions could benefit from relaxing IPRs). 
Diwan and Rodrik (1991) provide a somewhat different perspective by emphasizing that 
North and South may have different innovation needs (i.e., different tastes) such that 
strengthening IPR protection in any region induces a more favorable distribution of 
innovations suited for that region. Although only the North can innovate in their model, it 
is not necessarily the case that weaker IPR standards improve the welfare of the South.  
An issue quite germane to the economics of international IPRs, when viewed in the 
context of international harmonization, concerns the properties of an uncoordinated IPR 
Intellectual Property Rights and World Trade Organization: Retrospect and Prospects / 23 
equilibrium and the scope for negotiated multilateral improvements. The knowledge and 
information generated by new discoveries can easily move across national borders, and 
therefore policies that can affects the flow of innovations, such as IPR protection, gener-
ate (typically uncompensated) externalities on other countries. When IPR protection is 
chosen independently by countries, the optimal policy for a country depends on the 
choices of other countries, and the uncoordinated equilibrium will be affected by the 
rational attempt by countries to free ride on the policies of others. This problem is lucidly 
investigated by Grossman and Lai (2002), who consider a world of two countries (North 
and South) that differ in their market size and ability to innovate. Production yields a 
homogeneous good and a continuum of differentiated products, the latter produced by 
private R&D investments that are affected by the length of patent protection. Taking the 
“national treatment” of patents as given, the authors first investigate the equilibrium 
patent length when countries act independently. They find that, in the Nash equilibrium 
of the noncooperative patent-setting game, individual countries set a shorter patent life in 
an open economy than they would under autarky (an immediate consequence of the 
countries’ individual incentives to free ride). In a world of many countries with some 
large countries, the free-rider problem is exacerbated and a small country may well 
choose zero patent protection in a Nash equilibrium. In Grossman and Lai’s (2002) 
model, the structural differences of the two countries (market size and ability to innovate) 
also explain why patent protection is longer in the North than in the South in the uncoop-
erative equilibrium. Comparative statics analysis shows that an increase in the South’s 
ability to do research (relative to the North) would induce stronger patent protection in 
the South and weaker patent protection in the North.  
The existence of cross-border externalities provides scope for an international IPR 
agreement. In Grossman and Lai’s (2002) model, it turns out that world welfare depends 
only on an overall patent protection level (a weighted sum of individual protection rates), 
and an efficient global patent regime can be achieved with many combinations of patent 
protection (over some domain, protection in the North can substitute for that in the South 
and vice versa).11 The latter conclusion means that patent harmonization (equal patent 
protection in the North and South) is not necessary for global efficiency. But another 
finding is that an efficient patent policy does require worldwide strengthening of IPR 
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regimes (i.e., a higher weighted sum of individual patent protection rates). If this tighten-
ing of patent protection is to be achieved by a harmonized structure, then typically 
efficient harmonization entails an increase of patent protection in both regions (relative to 
the Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative solution). These conclusions are illustrated in 
Figure 3, where the intersection of the North and South’s best response functions (BRFs) 
determined the noncooperative Nash equilibrium. The locus of efficient patent protection 
measures ( NT  and ST ) is to the northeast of both BRFs, such that efficient IPRs do entail 
strengthening relative to the Nash equilibrium. Harmonized patents are neither necessary 
nor sufficient for global efficiency. 
 
 
Source: Grossman and Lai 2002 and Lai and Qiu 2003. 
FIGURE 3. Noncooperative and efficient patent protection 
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The welfare effects in this setting are important, however, because patent harmoniza-
tion quite likely hurts the South, although it benefits the North. Lai and Qiu (2003) also 
find that raising IPR protection in the South above its noncooperative Nash equilibrium 
solution is globally welfare improving; the South is hurt, but the North gains more than 
what is lost in the South. Starting from the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, and given 
adequate compensation from the North to the South, both regions could be better off if 
the South were to adopt the IPR standards of the North. This observation provides a 
direct rationale for linking IPR policies with trade policies (which could, in principle, 
provide the means for compensating the South for the welfare losses that may arise from 
adopting the North’s stronger IPR standards).  
 
TRIPS, Trade, and Economics: A Tentative Assessment 
Having provided some detail on institutional developments in the areas of interna-
tional IPRs, including TRIPS, and taking stock of the cursory review of relevant 
economic analyses discussed in the foregoing, I will now articulate a tentative assessment 
of TRIPS from the perspective of economics (being mindful, of course, that perhaps this 
is an overly ambitious goal). For concreteness, the following discussion is centered on a 
few select and critical questions that have emerged in this context.  
Are IPRs, in fact, trade related? This question is suggested by the carefully chosen 
prefix “trade related” that first rationalized introducing IPRs into the WTO. Of course, 
virtually any economic regulation and/or institution will have (perhaps indirect) effects on 
trade and, vice versa, trade does impact the workings of specific regulations and/or institu-
tions. But in fact, as the foregoing discussion has illustrated, it is quite apparent that weak 
or non-existent IPRs can affect trade in a direct and nontrivial manner. This is most evident 
for goods that are easily copied (“pirated,” in the favorite jargon of the industries con-
cerned), such as computer software and the optical media products of the entertainment 
industry (e.g., music and movies). Goods that rely on trademark protection are also quite 
vulnerable to weak IPR protection. Indeed, firms in virtually every industry (e.g., apparel, 
computer software and hardware, electronic equipment, prepared food and beverages, and 
pharmaceuticals) depend on trademarks for their marketing activities. Establishing a firm’s 
reputation for quality, which can be efficiently conveyed to the consumer by known 
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trademarks, requires significant investments in design, production, and marketing. Such 
costs are not borne by producers of knockoff copies or counterfeit merchandise who, absent 
IPRs, could easily free ride on the efforts of others. This can bring about losses to the 
legitimate mark owners and weaken their incentive to invest in quality production, which 
can be harmful to consumers (who end up facing a generalized “lemons” problem).  In fact, 
it seems that counterfeiting and pirating have increased significantly in recent years, 
especially in emerging markets such as China and countries of the former Soviet Union, 
and threaten to become a truly global business (Economist, 2003). 
Whether and how stronger IPRs affect the extent and direction of trade is less clear. 
More trade could result, as “legitimate” products from the innovating exporting country 
substitute for domestic “illegitimate” copies and/or imitations. But less trade could also 
result, for at least two reasons: because of the incentive for IPRs holders to limit produc-
tion (the monopolist effect), and because strong IPRs may make possible legitimate 
domestic production (possibly through foreign direct investment [FDI]) that is a perfect 
substitute for the formerly imported legitimate product. Although empirical evidence on 
such contrasting market expansion and market power effects is not conclusive, an earlier 
study by Maskus and Penubarti (1995) concludes that increasing patent protection does 
have a positive effect on bilateral manufacturing exports of OECD countries with both 
large and small developing countries (the effect on the imports of large developing 
countries being more significant). Fink and Primo Braga (1999) present results consistent 
with this finding. Using a gravity model of bilateral trade flows for 89 countries, and 
relying on the index developed by Ginarte and Park (1997) to measure cross-country 
differences in IPRs, they find a positive link between IPR protection and flows of non-
fuel trade aggregates. (But, somewhat surprising, the effect is not significant for high 
technology trade flows.) Smith (1999) analyzes the exports of U.S. states to a large 
number of destination countries. She finds that weak patent rights can negatively affect 
U.S. exports, especially in countries that pose a strong threat of imitation. More recently, 
Smith (2002) analyzes the empirical impacts of IPRs of U.S. exports in three disaggre-
gated drug industries. She again finds that strong foreign IPRs tend to expand U.S. 
exports in countries with a strong capacity to imitate (such as other developed countries), 
but in countries with weak imitative abilities, the effect of stronger IPRs may be that of 
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reducing trade because of enhanced market power. In any event, whether trade is posi-
tively or negatively affected by stronger IPRs is not necessarily the relevant question 
from the point of view of the integrated global economy. 
The case of agriculture is of some interest here because TRIPS mandates less uni-
formity of IPRs for this sector. For example, new transgenic varieties can be patented 
(and they are) in the United States, but elsewhere they may enjoy only a weaker protec-
tion under PBRs. The example of Roundup Ready (RR) soybean seeds is instructive. The 
RR technology is patented in the United States, and RR soybean seeds are sold at a 
considerable premium (about 40 percent markup over conventional varieties’ price) and 
under contractual obligations that prevent farmers from saving seeds.  In Argentina, 
however, it is legal for farmers to save seeds for replanting purposes, and as a conse-
quence, the RR soybean technology is available at lower cost to Argentine farmers than 
to U.S. farmers (U.S. GAO 2000). Such cost differences engineered by differing IPRs 
have the potential to affect the relative competitive positions of exporting countries, and 
certainly create tension, in the innovating country, between the interests of the innovating 
seed industry and the interests of the adopting agricultural sector (Moschini, Lapan, and 
Sobolevsky 2000).  
Do IPRs belong in the WTO? Granted that IPRs are “trade related,” the question still 
remains as to whether they should be an integral part of WTO activities. This was per-
haps the hot question prior to the TRIPS Agreement and, as a matter of institutional 
design, it has been settled by the agreement itself. As a matter of intellectual pursuit, the 
problem is as interesting as ever. As noted earlier, a number of economists have ex-
pressed skepticism about the wisdom of including IPRs in the WTO. Observers from 
related disciplines see the TRIPS Agreement as a fundamental change from previous 
GATT endeavors, reaching deep behind national borders in the pursuit of an efficient 
international regulation through a “globalization of law” (Arup 2000). Indeed, this is 
precisely the point of those who argue the pros and cons of other issues—such as the 
environment, investment, labor standards, and competition policy—being addressed 
explicitly by the WTO. Maskus (2002b) concludes that the cases of IPRs and of competi-
tion policy are somewhat more suited for inclusion in the WTO, largely because of their 
direct bearing on market access.  
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But acknowledging that IPRs and trade are related, and that the solution of the cross-
border externalities inextricably associated with this issue may require an integrated 
approach such as the one offered by the WTO, a related question still remains. Is stronger 
global IPR protection desirable? It is, after all, a fact that a main feature of TRIPS has 
been to require IPRs where none were present, without lowering any of the existing 
standards, thus resulting in a higher average global protection level. There is, in fact, no 
reason to presume that stronger IPRs per se are desirable. From a given closed (inte-
grated) economy perspective, the optimal degree of protection for IPRs depends on the 
aforementioned trade-off between static (monopoly) losses and dynamic efficiency gains, 
that is, the need for “exclusion” versus the desire for “diffusion.” But, as discussed in 
Ordover (1991), this trade-off may too simplistic a viewpoint, and a carefully designed 
IPR protection system need not be incompatible with diffusion. For example, when the 
patent regime is weak, innovators may choose to achieve exclusion by using methods 
such as trade secrets that are actually worse from the point of view of ensuring the 
diffusion of new knowledge. Whether or not the current IPR standards are too strong is a 
matter of debate. In the United States, for instance, some have worried that patent protec-
tions may be too slanted in favor of inventors, all but eliminating the distinction between 
discovery and invention, granting claims that are too broad and lowering the standard of 
novelty (e.g., Merges 1999).  
A more subtle issue is whether, as the size of the market increases because more and 
more countries fall under a more-or-less common set of IPR standards, the optimal level 
of IPR protection implied by those standards should increase or decrease.  As discussed 
earlier, because the incentive to perform private R&D under IPRs derives from the profits 
that a monopolist can realize, it is already directly affected by an expanding market, and 
no strengthening of IPRs may be necessary. Furthermore, in an international context, the 
strategic considerations mentioned earlier are quite germane. The temptation to free ride 
makes unilaterally set IPRs lower than globally optimal, and as more countries agree to 
set IPR protection cooperatively, the effect normally would be that of increasing the level 
of protection. But as a counterpoint, the analysis of Scotchmer (2002) is of some interest. 
She studies the abilities of IPR treaties to deal with the inherent cross-border externalities 
in a game-theoretic model where governments have access to two tools to foster innova-
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tions: IPR protection (which spurs private R&D efforts) and public R&D spending 
(which produces a pure public good). Both instruments tend to create uncompensated 
cross-border externalities, but IPR treaties deal with only one of them. One of the conclu-
sions that emerges in this setting is that harmonization of IPR regimes through negotiated 
treaties may end up providing excessively high IPR standards.  
A difference between previous multilateral trade liberalization efforts and TRIPS is 
often noted. The argument is that previous GATT negotiations likely resulted in mutual 
gains for most (all?) countries through symmetric tariff rate cuts that yielded different 
final levels of protection, whereas, by contrast, the implementation of TRIPS commit-
ments requires very asymmetric changes in the level of IPR protection offered by 
countries (e.g., Gaisford and Richardson, 2000). Thus, the TRIPS Agreement may be 
associated with large distributional effects, and the question then arises: Are there win-
ners and losers from TRIPS? The concern specifically has been that such welfare transfer 
would be from the poor developing countries to the rich developed countries. McCalman 
(2001) provides quantitative estimates for the effects of patent harmonization as implied 
by TRIPS for a group of 29 countries, including both developed and developing coun-
tries. He finds that, indeed, the implementation of TRIPS has the potential to generate 
large transfers, and that the United States is the major recipient of those transfers. Devel-
oping countries are net “losers,” but a number of developed countries (including Canada, 
the United Kingdom, and Japan) are also net contributors to these welfare transfers. 
These conclusions may reflect too much of a static viewpoint and ignore the dynamic 
effects that TRIPS can have on the incentives to innovate and to transfer technology. 
And, as displayed earlier in Table 1, a number of wealthy developed countries are also 
running a deficit in their technology balance of payments and arguably are getting 
positive impacts from the purchase of production-ready high technologies. More to the 
point, it is unclear what one should conclude from the evidence of asymmetric benefits 
and costs arising from TRIPS. Perhaps what that means is that, for an agreement of that 
kind, compensation is necessary to find consensus. Some would argue that the WTO 
negotiating platform is, therefore, ideally suited to handle the ambitious globalization of 
IPRs envisioned by TRIPS because it could, at least in principle, provide compensation 
through the economic effects of other agreements. For instance, it was widely believed, 
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after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, that the developing countries, in exchange for 
their acceptance of TRIPS, got concessions from developed countries in the areas of 
textile, agriculture, and privileged market access through a continuation of the general-
ized system of preference.  
Do stronger IPRs promote international technology transfer? This question is of direct 
importance for the case in favor of a positive global impact of TRIPS. That international 
diffusion of technological know-how is critical to development and growth is dramatically 
illustrated by the model of Eaton and Kortum (1996). They show that every OECD country 
other than the United States obtains more than 50 percent of its productivity growth from 
ideas originating abroad. But because such international knowledge diffusion relies on a 
variety of modes—including trade in innovated inputs, imitation, licensing, and FDI—
whether and how stronger IPRs can affect international technology transfer remains a 
difficult question. Lai (1998) contrasts FDI and imitation in a general equilibrium North-
South model and finds that the result depends on which of these modes applies. If imitation 
is the avenue for technology transfer, stronger IPRs in the South lower the rate on innova-
tion in this region, but if technology is transferred through FDI, the opposite holds. The 
analytical conclusions about FDI are consistent with the empirical findings of Lee and 
Mansfield (1996) who, from a survey of 100 U.S. firms, conclude that the perceived 
strength/weakness of a country’s IPR system is a critical factor in determining the volume 
and composition of U.S. foreign direct investment.  
As Table 4 illustrates, FDI has, to date, privileged developed countries. Although 
stronger IPRs may not be the only relevant factor here, it is likely that they play an impor-
tant role. Transfer of technology through licensing, of course, must rely critically on IPRs 
for the establishment of a viable “technology market” (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella 
2001). When considering international transactions, with the contracting distortions that 
may be expected in that context, it seems that technology transfer through licensing would 
be affected positively by stronger IPRs (Yang and Maskus 2003). Stronger IPRs in the 
recipient country make it easier to carry out technology transfer with the consent of the 
(foreign) innovator, but of course they also raise the costs of unilateral technology transfer 
through copying and imitation. Which of the two contrasting effects dominates may depend  
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TABLE 4. Foreign direct investment, selected years (millions of U.S. dollars)  
  1970 1980 1990 2000 2001 
FDI Inflows 12,586 54,945 202,782 1,491,934 735,146 World 
FDI outflows 14,141 53,674 233,315 1,379,493 620,713 
FDI Inflows 9,477 46,530 164,575 1,227,476 503,144 Developed 
countries 
FDI outflows 14,110 50,343 216,562 1,271,273 580,624 
FDI Inflows 3,109 8,380 37,567 237,894 204,801 Developing 
countries 
FDI outflows 30 3,310 16,700 104,207 36,571 
FDI Inflows - - - 35 639 26,563 27,200 Central and Eastern 
Europe FDI outflows - - - 21 54 4,012 3,518 
Source: UNCTAD, Division on Investment, Technology and Enterprise Development. 
Notes: There are three components in FDI: equity capital, reinvested earnings, and intra-company loans. 
Inflows = capital received from an FDI enterprise by a foreign direct investor. Outflows = capital provided 
by a foreign direct investor to an FDI enterprise.  
 
on a variety of factors, including the type of technology and the attribute of the recipient 
country. Trade flows and welfare effects are similarly ambiguous, although Maskus (2000) 
is, on balance, optimistic about the likely overall positive effects of IPRs on the quantity 
and quality of international technology transfer. 
The foregoing discussion can be viewed as part of a larger question: Is TRIPS useful 
for development? This is perhaps the question that has attracted the most attention by 
commentators, spurred by the apparent asymmetry in adjustments called for by TRIPS, as 
well as the huge differences across developed and developing countries in the current 
extent of IPR-protected innovations. The latter point is illustrated in Table 5, which reports 
patent applications filed through the PCT (Patent Coooperation Treaty). These figures 
provide a useful indicator of the distribution of innovations that have international interest. 
Quite clearly, patenting is an activity mainly of developed countries. The United States, the 
European Union, and Japan, for example, accounted for about 87 percent of all PCT patent 
applications in the year 2002. Patenting activity in developing countries is insignificant. 
The issues involved in analyzing the impact of TRIPS on development are admittedly 
complex, and the literature on the subject is just too vast to be dealt with except summarily  
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TABLE 5. Patent applications through the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
 Applications Percent Applications Percent 
 2002  2001 
United States 44,609 39.1% 40,003 38.5% 
Canada 2,210 1.9% 2,030 2.0% 
Brazil 204 0.2% 193 0.2% 
Other America 189 0.2% 143 0.1% 
     
European Union - 15 40,665 35.7% 37,571 36.1% 
Germany 15,269 13.4% 13,616 13.1% 
United Kingdom 6,274 5.5% 6,233 6.0% 
France 4,877 4.3% 4,619 4.4% 
Netherlands 4,019 3.5% 3,187 3.1% 
Sweden 2,988 2.6% 3,502 3.4% 
Italy 2,041 1.8% 1,574 1.5% 
Finland 1,762 1.5% 1,623 1.6% 
     
Switzerland  2,469 2.2% 2,011 1.9% 
Russian Federation 616 0.5% 551 0.5% 
Norway 525 0.5% 525 0.5% 
Other Europe 686 0.6% 670 0.6% 
     
Japan 13,531 11.9% 11,846 11.4% 
South Korea 2,552 2.2% 2,318 2.2% 
China 1,124 1.0% 1,670 1.6% 
India 480 0.4% 316 0.3% 
Other Asia 379 0.3% 291 0.3% 
     
Australia 1,775 1.6% 1,754 1.7% 
New Zealand 301 0.3% 279 0.3% 
     
Israel 1,199 1.1% 1,248 1.2% 
Other Middle East 103 0.1% 94 0.1% 
     
South Africa 407 0.4% 418 0.4% 
Other Africa 24 0.0% 16 0.0% 
     
Total 114,048 100.0% 103,947 100.0% 
Source: WIPO, Yearly Review of the PCT: 2002. 
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here. One of the most recent and authoritative statements on the subject is the report by the 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002), a body appointed by the British 
government. The overall conclusion, it seems, is decidedly skeptical on the constructive 
role that strong IPRs may have on development. The report notes that TRIPS imposes an 
onerous burden on most developing countries, and it supports the thesis that the desirable 
level of IPR protection depends on the stage of development: at earlier stages, weaker (not 
stronger) IPRs are more likely to foster economic development. The commission also 
emphasizes that developing countries are not a homogeneous group, that the optimal IPR 
system (from the perspective of development) is bound to vary from country to country, 
and that to insist on too much IPR harmonization may be detrimental to development. But 
the report also recognizes that TRIPS gives developing countries considerable latitude in 
implementing the higher IPR standards mandated by the agreement. 
This and related analyses do provide considerable food for though and are compel-
ling in their characterization of the complex nature of the development question. Yet they 
pay scant attention to the core economic problem emphasized by the theoretical work in 
this area: the cross-border externalities associated with the production of innovations, and 
the associated free rider problem. To make claims about what is an “optimal” IPR policy 
for a developing country abstracting from this strategic problem is unsatisfactory to say 
the least. Of course, any small country is likely to be better off by free riding on the 
innovative efforts of others. In fact, the free-rider problem in this context is even more 
general because, as analyzed by Yang (1998), developing countries also have an incen-
tive to free ride on each other (in addition to free riding on developed countries), which is 
particularly deleterious to the development of technologies that are specifically appropri-
ate for their needs. Thus, the choice may not be simply between getting an innovation for 
free or having to pay for it, as the availability of appropriate innovations for the South, 
and the timely and efficient distribution and adoption of these and other technologies, 
cannot be taken for granted. This is not to say that any IPR policy and/or standard is 
good. But the claim that some IPR policies are good for the North, whereas quite a 
different approach is good for the South, is just one (unproven) thesis. An alternative is 
that bad IPR policies are just as likely to be bad for the North as for the South, and what 
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is good in one region (in terms of solving a very real market failure and promoting 
innovation) may well be desirable for all regions in a cooperative equilibrium. 
The (rather commonly held) view that strong IPRs are not good for development 
would be more convincing if we knew what, in fact, is good for development. Unfortu-
nately, it seems we do not. Easterly (2001) provides a sobering reminder of the failures of 
many past and present policies meant to foster growth in developing countries and dispels 
what he terms the myths of benevolent development assistance. What has been learned is 
mostly about the things that do not work: state planning, protectionist policies aimed at 
import substitution, price controls, debt forgiveness, and privileging current consumption 
over investment. As Wacziarg (2002) notes, “Domestic policies and politics, not multina-
tionals and capitalist imperialists, are largely to blame for unproductive rent-seeking and 
plunder.” Whereas it is unrealistic to presume that stronger IPRs per se will produce 
extensive gains for developing countries, they probably constitute an essential element of 
a package that eschews the misguided policies that have failed in the past. Maskus (2000, 
chap. 7) argues that IPR protection in developing countries should be coupled with 
policies that promote dynamic competition and technical change, such as those aimed at 
liberalizing trade and investments, curbing corruption, promoting human capital and 
technical skills, as well as fostering social and economic freedom. Perhaps the most 
positive impact that TRIPS can have on development in the long run is to contribute to 
the establishment of political and social institutions that allow markets to work. Focusing 
specifically on agriculture, Perrin (1999) notes that, without stronger IPRs, it is unlikely 
that productivity rates in developing countries can begin to catch up with those of devel-
oped countries.  
 
Current Issues and Prospects 
Public Health 
TRIPS figured prominently in the Doha WTO ministerial meeting in November 
2001, and resulted in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. 
The concerted effort of developed countries, assisted by the emerging influence of non-
government organizations (NGOs), brought to the fore the public health problems afflict-
ing many of them, especially those associated with HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and 
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other epidemics. The declaration stressed that TRIPS “… does not and should not prevent 
members from taking measures to protect public health.” Specifically, the declaration (a) 
recognized that compulsory licensing could be used to procure critical drugs, at each 
member’s discretion; (b) acknowledged that each member is free to adopt the desired 
mode of exhaustion of IPRs (which bears on whether parallel imports are allowed into a 
country or not); (c) recognized that developing countries with insufficient drug manufac-
turing abilities would face difficulties in taking advantage of compulsory licensing, and 
thus instructed the Council for TRIPS to find a solution to this problem by December 
2002; and (d) extended until January 2016 the deadline for LDCs to implement IPR 
protection for pharmaceuticals and test data. The problem addressed in point (c) arises 
because TRIPS stipulates that compulsory licenses may be used primarily to supply the 
domestic market. But timely resolution of this issue failed, and the United States (alone 
among 144 WTO countries) has opposed the adoption of a compromise solution that 
would allow LDCs to couple compulsory licensing with imports. Possibly backtracking 
from an earlier position (Wall Street Journal 2003a), the United States is insisting that the 
coverage of such waivers should be limited to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and 
similarly infectious diseases.  
The scale of the public health problem confronting a number of LDCs, especially in 
Africa, is huge. In some sub-Saharan countries, for example, one-third of the adult 
population is infected with the HIV/AIDS virus. Access to drugs and health care services 
is a real problem. Patents on pharmaceuticals, through their impact on higher drug prices, 
may contribute to the problem, although they may not be the main stumbling block.12 
Many essential medicines, in developed and developing countries alike, are actually off 
patent. Poverty, lack of health insurance, and lack of a reliable public health care system 
may be the real roots of third-world health care tragedies (Maskus 2002a). Although 
access may be just as much of a problem for drugs already in the public domain, most 
analysts think that the Doha’s TRIPS efforts in this area can make a positive contribution. 
Developments here also highlight the relevance of an open issue within TRIPS, that 
which relates to international exhaustion of rights.  
36 / Moschini 
Exhaustion of Rights and Parallel Imports 
Efforts in the Uruguay Round to find a unified stance failed, and TRIPS explicitly 
leaves it to individual countries to decide whether they want to rely on the “international 
exhaustion” doctrine or whether they want to implement a “national exhaustion” princi-
ple. Under the latter, the right of the IPR holder on the product expires with the first sale 
in that jurisdiction, but the IPR holder retains the right to exclude (parallel) imports and 
exports in that region. Under the former, the right of the IPR holder expires with the first 
sale anywhere. Quite clearly, the main difference is that national exhaustion allows 
innovators to price the product differently in different markets (i.e., to practice third-
degree price discrimination), whereas international exhaustion prevents that because 
parallel trade allows arbitrage across markets (Malueg and Schwartz 1994). It has been 
established that price discrimination can (albeit it need not) improve welfare for society 
at large, relative to standard monopoly pricing (Varian 1988). Certainly, in our interna-
tional context, price discrimination (relative to uniform pricing) would improve the 
welfare of those importing countries for which the price is lower under discrimination, 
that is, countries with relatively more elastic demands. The case is particularly evident 
when some markets are not served under uniform pricing, as illustrated in Figure 4. 
Because LDCs are likely to have more elastic demands for drugs than are developed 
countries, price discrimination is likely to be beneficial to them. Yet developing countries 
are generally opposed to revisiting TRIPS stipulations on the grounds of exhaustion of 
IPRs.13 Again, it seems that what is at work here is the strategic incentives facing indi-
vidual countries. Although individually and as a whole, LDCs would arguably gain by 
cooperatively giving up the right to parallel imports, each individual country may have a 
unilateral incentive to deviate from this strategy because it could benefit from parallel 
imports from a market with lower prices. On the other hand, preliminary analysis of 
international sales data for AIDS anti-retroviral drugs is not particularly supportive of the 
notion that pharmaceutical companies will practice much international price discrimina-
tion, and the interplay of such price discrimination with parallel imports/exports can 
arguably be more complex than discussed here (Scherer and Watal 2002). 
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FIGURE 4.B. Monopoly with uniform pricing 
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Geographical indications 
Geographical indications (GIs) are one of the IPRs contemplated by TRIPS, but not 
much has been done to implement such rights. Ongoing negotiations center on the 
establishment of a multilateral system of notification and registration of GIs for wines 
and spirits—products that were singled out by TRIPS as eligible for a stronger GI protec-
tion (they must be protected even if there is no risk of the consumer being misled or of 
unfair competition). Agreement is still lacking, with one group of countries (including the 
United States, Canada, Japan, and Australia) envisioning a registration system working 
like a database but with countries “voluntarily” deciding whether to grant GI protection. 
Another group of countries (including the European Union) envisions a system of “volun-
tary” registration but with mandatory protection for registered products (ICTSD-IISD, 
2003). As mandated by the Doha Declaration under the “implementation” issues, the 
TRIPS Council is also considering requests to extend the higher level of GI protection 
accorded to wine and spirits to other products. Deep divisions among countries exist on 
this topic (see, e.g., Wall Street Journal 2003b), and progress is unlikely. 
Biodiversity, Traditional Knowledge, and Folklore 
The Doha Declaration mandated that the Council for TRIPS examine the relationship 
between TRIPS, the CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity), and the protection of 
traditional knowledge and folklore. Some countries from the developing world are 
requesting a modification of TRIPS to include provisions to prevent biopiracy and 
uncompensated use of traditional knowledge. For example, it has been suggested that 
patent applications in WTO countries should disclose the source/country of origin of 
biological material used in the invention, as a first step for the establishment of a more 
“equitable” sharing of benefits. Developed countries, the United States in particular, are 
resisting such proposals, and the outlook is not encouraging. From the perspective of 
economics, it seems that such proposals, and much of the philosophy underlying the CBD 
in this area, puts too much emphasis on “sharing” benefits as opposed to creating them. 
This seems to miss the point that the main function of IPRs is to provide incentives for 
new innovations, not to provide a rent position for already existing resources. To be sure, 
patents that simply recycle know-how from afar (whether or not that belongs to tradi-
tional knowledge) are just bad patents, and increased efforts are warranted to ensure the 
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broadest possible consideration of prior art by patent examiners. Also, “conservation” of 
biodiversity is in fact an activity that could be valuable from society’s point of view, 
although its current value to the pharmaceutical industry may be too low to allow sub-
stantial funds to be mobilized through benefit-sharing mechanisms (e.g., Simpson, Sedjo, 
and Reid 1996). 
 
Conclusion 
Whether or not the WTO is the most appropriate forum for dealing with international 
coordination of IPRs remains a matter of opinion, but the TRIPS Agreement makes that 
question somewhat academic. An increasing share of economic activity worldwide is 
aimed at the production of goods and services that require considerable R&D investment, 
and the exchange of such goods and service relies heavily on the possibility of protecting 
the underlying R&D investment from expropriation by copying and imitation. Such 
concerns have long been addressed by the legal institutional setting of most developed 
countries, but insofar as goods and services are traded across national borders, national 
IPRs clearly do not suffice. The TRIPS Agreement represents the most ambitious attempt 
to date at coming to grips with these realities. The salient feature of TRIPS, as compared 
with previous international cooperation treaties in IPRs such as those managed by WIPO, 
is that it makes an extensive set of IPR protection standards mandatory for WTO mem-
bership, that is, a requirement for the continued enjoyment of the gains from freer trade 
made possible by a half-century of GATT efforts. In so doing, it has taken the WTO into 
new territory, perhaps heralding a greater future role for the WTO in nontraditional areas 
(such as environmental standards, labor standards, competition policy, investment, and 
government procurements).  
As with any undertaking of this scale and scope, TRIPS is but an imperfect compro-
mise, no matter what the viewpoint, on the many unresolved questions that it prompts. 
Mostly, TRIPS is a work in progress. A crucial issue in the IPRs area is “enforcement.” 
The WTO dispute settlement procedure will have to deal with the compliance of parties 
with the letter of the agreement. The record so far provides some cause for optimism. 
Interestingly, most of the TRIPS disputes to date have pitted developed countries against 
each other, and not developed countries against developing countries (Matthews 2002). 
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This fact is at odds with the crude interpretation that sees TRIPS mostly as pitting the 
interests of developed countries versus those of developing countries (e.g., GRAIN, 
2001). It is also useful to note that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism provides 
considerable more guarantees of objectivity than do the summary indictments possible 
with unilateral trade sanctions under the U.S. Special 301 process. Thus, the WTO forum 
may be more appealing for developing countries concerned with the aggressive pro-IPRs 
agenda of developed countries. But the real enforcement issues for TRIPS are likely to be 
at the national level, after TRIPS compliance of laws is achieved. It remains to be seen 
how effective national enforcement of nominal IPR protection will be, especially in 
developing countries, and how sensitive TRIPS-illegal economic behavior will be to 
(inevitably imperfect) enforcement.14  
In addition to the outstanding implementation issues, there are opportunities for po-
tential extensions and refinements of the TRIPS Agreement. What is in doubt is whether 
any consensus is likely to emerge given the diverging agendas of developed and develop-
ing countries. Although developed countries cannot be assumed to have a unified agenda, 
broadly speaking what they would like is a tightening of the existing TRIPS, the closing 
of loopholes, and an extension of the scope of protection under the agreement. TRIPS 
provides considerable flexibility in a number of areas, especially for IPRs related to 
newer technologies. No provision is included in TRIPS, for example, about IPRs related 
to Internet data transmission and e-commerce. Indeed, two treaties in this area have been 
completed under WIPO after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round (the Copyright Treaty 
and the Performances and Phonogram Treaties), and developed countries would like to 
see the substantial provisions of those treaties brought into TRIPS. There is also interest 
in clarifying the protection by patents for biotechnology innovations, and possibly in 
revisiting the provision that allows members to exclude plants and animals from pat-
entability (TRIPS actually contemplates a built-in mandatory review of this clause). At a 
minimum, the United States would like to see the UPOV 1991 convention explicitly 
identified as the standard for the allowed sui generis protection of plant varieties. Devel-
oping countries, on the other hand, have a virtually opposite agenda on many of these 
issues and are intent on defending the flexibilities provided for in TRIPS (including the 
freedom to choose a sui generis system for plant varieties that is more lax than UPOV 
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1991, especially with reference to farmers’ right to save and exchange seeds). Developing 
countries would also like to reconcile the provisions of TRIPS with the CBD, including, 
as discussed earlier, the issue of whether to require disclosure in patent applications of 
the source of biological materials used. 
The congruence of developed countries’ agendas with TRIPS should not be overes-
timated, however, as differences exists in many areas. One continuing bone of contention 
is the U.S. reliance on the first-to-invent rule for awarding patents, as opposed to the first-
to-file criterion used by virtually all other WTO members. The European Union and the 
United States remain at odds on issues related to the patenting of plants and animals. 
And, as mentioned earlier, the issue of GIs is pitting European countries and a number of 
developing countries against the United States and other developed “new world” coun-
tries. NGOs are also going to be a factor if amendments to TRIPS were to be undertaken, 
as amply illustrated by their high-profile presence in the debate concerning the impact of 
TRIPS on access to essential medicines by poor countries. The growing disappointment 
of developing countries with the alleged quid pro quo of the Uruguay Round (TRIPS in 
exchange for concession in textiles and agriculture) also suggests that benefits and costs 
of changes to TRIPS may have to be traded off on their own merits, rather than relying on 
cross-agreement compensations. Given the fragmented interests of the various relevant 
constituencies, it seems unlikely that TRIPS will experience any substantial revision 




1. For example, IPRs are enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, where Article 1 estab-
lished that “Congress shall have the power … to promote the progress of science and 
useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right 
to their respective writing and discoveries.”  
2. Important kinds of scientific discoveries—such as laws of nature, natural phenom-
ena, and abstract ideas—have traditionally been outside the statutory scope of 
patents. But recent developments in patenting new technologies (such as computer 
software, information technology, and biotechnology) are challenging a strong inter-
pretation of such exclusions. 
3. Exceptions to the national treatment obligation allowed under pre-existing WIPO 
conventions are permitted. Where these exceptions allow material reciprocity, the 
implied exception to MFN treatment is also permitted. 
4. WTO members may provide a more extensive protection of intellectual property if 
they so wish.  
5. TRIPS also mandates compliance with substantial provisions of the 1989 Treaty on 
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, and makes explicit reference 
to the 1961 Rome Convention, although there is no obligation to comply with the 
substantive provisions of that convention. 
6. Developing countries that did not provide product patent protection prior to TRIPS 
were given 10 years to introduce such protection. But some substitute provisions 
were mandated for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products.  
7. Although, oddly enough, there is no such prohibition against patenting plants per se. 
8. The European Patent Office, for example, apparently takes a rather liberal definition 
of microorganisms, which are held to include bacteria, yeasts, fungi, algae, protozoa, 
plasmids, viruses, as well as single cells from multicellular organisms (plants and 
animals, including humans) (Dutfield 2003). 
9. Machlup and Penrose (1951) cite part of this quotation. This excerpt is from Mills 
(1900, Book 5, Chapter 10). 
10. This brief review necessarily neglects a number of important elements in the eco-
nomic analysis of patents, such as their impacts on the dissemination of information, 
their coordination role in avoiding wasteful duplication of innovation efforts, their 
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potential role in technology transfer and commercialization of new products, the po-
tential shortcomings of excessively broad patents, the special problems that arise 
with patent races and with cumulative and/or complementary innovations, and the 
role of industry structure. For an introduction to these issues, see Langinier and Mo-
schini 2002. 
11. The nonuniqueness of the set of patent lengths that yield efficiency is anticipated in 
the more restrictive model considered by McCalman (2002). This paper, and that of 
Richardson and Gaisford (1996), also had noted that, in a North-South two-country 
setting, independently chosen patent policies are not efficient. 
12. Attaran and Gillespie-White (2001), in a controversial study, argued that patents and 
patent law may not pose a major barrier to access to medical treatment in LDCs. For 
the case of HIV/AIDS, in any event, prevention is arguably a more pressing issue 
than cure, and the record of some countries on this score is disappointing. 
13. Most developed countries practice the national exhaustion principle, except for 
Japan, where international exhaustion applies (with some qualifications). In the 
European Union, national exhaustion really applies to the Union as a whole, and in 
Australia, international exhaustion applies to trademarks (Maskus and Chen 2002). 
14. Some economic issues related to TRIPS enforcement are considered by Gaisford et 
al. (2002) and Giannakas (2002).
  
Appendix 
Summary of the TRIPS Agreement 
 
Feature Main Elements 
Scope 






marks, geographical indications, industrial designs, trade 
secrets 
General Obligations 






 (Art. 6) 
ion of IPRs is left to countries’ own  
discretion 
Objectives 



































procedures, or methods 
mputer programs and compilations of data are protected 
(but actual data not protected as such) 
Rental rights, and rights of performers, producers, and broad-
casters  
Trademarks 
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Feature Main Elements 
Geographical 
Indications 
 (Arts. 22-24) 
	

 use of “geographic” terms that 














be provided even when the public is not being misled 
Industrial Designs 












provided through copyrights instead) 
Patents 







technology, including biotechnology inventions such as for 








   - threaten ordre public or morality; 
   - diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods; 




























ceedings (defendant may be required to show it does not 
infringe patent) 
Integrated Circuits 

















cal or agricultural chemical 
Anti-competitive 
Practices  






by holders of IPRs 
e in investigating alleged abuse of 
IPRs that have international dimension 
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Feature Main Elements 
Enforcement 





holder, foreign or domestic, to secure acquisition and enforce-




injunctions, damages, and disposal of infringing goods 
		
		




alties must be available 
+			
	itious, 
not unnecessarily complex or costly 
Dispute Settlement 

















for developing countries (except for national treatment and 
MFN rule) 
   - Additional four years transitional period for developing coun-
tries (except for 
      national treatment and MFN rule) 
   - Extra five years on providing patents for new areas of technol-
ogy 
     (pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals), subject to a 
‘mailbox clause’  
8-developed countries can have 11-year delay on application 
of agreement, until January 2006. Further special extensions for 
pharmaceuticals (until January 2016) granted by the Doha Dec-
laration. 
Technical         
Cooperation  
 (Art. 67) 
-
	hall provide technical and financial 
assistance to developing and least-developed countries to facili-
tate implementation of the agreement on mutually agreed terms 
Institutional  





	ation of the 
agreement 
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